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Abstract 
In connection with nature protection, land ecology primarily deals 
with geographical forces ruling the suitability of any place on earth 
for nature, i.e. for any of its organisms. These geographical forces 
differ basically from the bio-physiologically operational stimuli orga-
nisms respond to. Physically, the latter are fluxes, resulting from 
driving forces and transmissivity factors in the surroundings of the 
organisms. 
In planning of surveys as well as policy, macroscopic models of the 
deducted system may show useful. The above tripartition of environmen-
tal factors has been explored as a possible basis for such a macroscopic 
systems model. For shortness of future communication, several words have 
been introduced. Fundamental concepts are the ecodevice and ecological 
field ones. Reference has been made to other publications using this' 
model or some or more of its elements or forbears. This paper can be 
regarded an addendum to these publications and a call for broadened dis-
cussion. 
Examples of application have not been given in the paper. Some studies 
are mentioned, however, which more or less explicitely do so. 
Introduction 
Nature protection aims at regulation of the environment to have cer-
tain organisms survive. In The Netherlands, mainly biological effort is 
put forward to combat the deterioration of habitats, suited for several 
organisms of nature. The processes involved in this deterioration conti-
nuing, widely available bio-ecological knowledge is confirmed daily: 
many human activities are far 'more' anyhow than most organisms can 
stand in their habitats. A change of species composition is noticed: 
obviously, common species become more common and rare ones still more 
rare, they become threatened with extinction from a region at least. 
If it is agreed biological species fit a specific environmental tem-
plate, which may be coproduced by other species, the interest is not 
primarily in the specification of this template or the way species get 
around with it, but in the question whether it will be affected by human 
activities or not. So the problem appears to be one of transfer of 
change in the environment. If change is transmitted as a result of trans-
ports of clearly defined physical quantities (including chemical or bio-
logical matter), key points will be linking the organisms sense of 
change to physical quantities and routing these change agents through 
the system. 
A maior step in the technique of nature protection in The Netherlands 
has been the introduction of the concept 'milieudynamiek' or environ-
mental inconstancy by van Leeuwen (1966) in his Theory of Relations 
(see also: Bakker, 1979 and Westhoff et al., 1970-1973). As their is 
uncertainty about the analytical nature of this deductive quantity, it 
will be kept vague in this paper by referring to it as 'midy' shortly. 
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According to this theory now, every place is said to have a certain 
amount of midy of its own, to which a supplementary amount is added "by 
the continued human use of the site. Organisms that tend to "become rarer 
as their stations become more intensively used by Man, apparently hate 
high amounts of midy, whereas those, becoming commoner, love it. Thus, 
organisms can "be used as midy indicators, "by just monitoring their occur-
rence in areas influenced by midy import. This is virtually all of The 
Netherlands today, as only some isolated nature reserves seem to escape 
from the processes involved. Yet, in the early stages of human occupa-
tion, use of the environment is by regionally redistributing midy, for 
instance by mowing and grazing large and remote areas of the region in 
favour of having arable fields close to the settlements. As many species 
endangered with extinction in The Netherlands now, showed an apparent 
increase in the past in the remote areas just mentioned, we cannot but 
conclude the natural amount of midy of those areas was negatively influ-
enced by the addition of some operational human midy. With respect to 
this, it is convenient to suppose there are latent or inactive forms of 
midy, next to active forms. Biomass would represent an inactive form of 
midy, which can be transported by applying a relatively small amount of 
active midy. If, in a more or less equilibriated geobiocoenose, the mean 
annual storage rate equals or only slightly exceeds the mean annual 
activation rate, disposal of stored midy will eventually lead to a de-
crease of active midy. 
Van Leeuwen has derived some rules for guessing midy from physically 
known aspects of the environment. For instance, several aspects of ener-
gy and mass represent midy positively: warm > cold, rich in nutrients 
> poor in nutrients, wet > dry, moving > calm. In the application of 
these rules, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the interaction 
of these midy-components. If an area is made drier, for instance, this 
may lead to an increase of midy. Physically, this can be understood by 
assuming nutrient supply has increased by diminishing wetness impact on 
soil mineralization processes. A relatively high degree of movement of 
groundwater may, in other cases, be important to maintain high calcium-
levels in a soil, thus effectively controling phosphorus uptake by 
plants and resulting in the presence of apparent midy-haters. Users of 
the midy concept in The Hetherlands know a lot of these things by expe-
rience from a wide range of types of land. They are therefore regarded 
a kind of sorcerers by those trying to translate randomly gathered eco-
logical data into midy. The latter category even tends to ban the whole 
subject from official science. In an attempt to bridge this gap between 
expert judgment and formal science, Van Leeuwen and I have worked togeth-
er from 1975 onwards, developing descriptive tools in order to enable 
more formal scientists to reconstruct the lines of thought. The present 
paper is, in addition to that by Van Leeuwen (I981), meant to draw atten-
tion to some of those tools. 
The main points combine into design requirements for landecological 
survey for nature protection, organized in some macroscopic systems 
model. Some parts of this model will be loosely discussed below, with 
emphasis on their description, relation to published concepts, and use. 
Tools for the execution of a real survey will not be given: they can be 
found in several textbooks on such fields of knowledge as soil science, 
hydrology, water chemistry and others. The macroscopic systems model 
just helps in the design of the survey; it is made to learn what avail-
able tools should be used at what instances in the execution of a sur-
vey. Or: if important things are found by chance, this model should help 
to increase the chance to find important things, but it does not change 
the rules for scientific proof. 
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The organism to "be protected is invariable 
Accept, for the moment, nature protection aims at regulation of the 
environment to have certain organisms (those, otherwise threatened with 
extinction) survive in acceptable numbers. 
Suppose, now, all individuals of a biological taxon react with their 
environment according to the same predetermined main part of their, say, 
biological program. At the lower hierarchical levels of taxonomy, and 
typically in species, this main part is nearly all of the biological 
program available. Noisy behaviour of individuals is neglectable. 
Exchange of biological program is controlled by heredity and can usually 
be considered without any alterations. In Homo sapiens, however, the 
biological program contains a routine, capable of generating technologi-
cal program interactively with the environment and the prevailing con-
tents of the continually growing technological program bank. Technologi-
cal program exchange between individuals does not use heredity control 
and is not by exact duplication. Predictable trends have been detected 
by the social sciences. Yet, in land (systems) ecology, technological 
program is safely dealt with as (alternative) constraints, to be defined 
in scenarios. Requirements to have scenarios realized or probabilities 
of scenarios to become reality should be afforded by social scientists. 
Consequently, an organism's biological program determines the environ-
mental template it needs to feed on and discharge into: the habitat it 
fits. Saying the habitat is surrounding concentrations, the milieu of 
its inhabitant is the feeding and discharging fluxes it is subject to in 
the habitat. If, with irreversible thermodynamics, the complex of con-
centration gradients in the habitat-organism interface is the generalized 
driving force in producing the organism's milieu, the milieu is genera-
lized fluxes, the organism's envelope representing transmissivity fac-
tors or phenomenological coefficients. Strictly speaking, habitat and 
milieu are only there , once the organism is in. If an organism moves 
around, it is supposed to carry both along with it. Measuring milieu 
will therefore be limited to large and homogeneous habitats, surrounding 
more or less spherical organims (microcosms with free-floating algae) 
or to the use of dummy inhabitants. (Most measuring tools are not too 
realistic as dummies). In nature protection, habitat and milieu must be 
considered inaccessible for operational regulation. The organism as a 
subject of protective regulation may thus be replaced by a lump of 
universe which contains it and which is equal to or greater than the 
organism plus its milieu plus its habitat. This lump of universe, in a 
systems approach, is an ecologically 'working' black box. 
Note that, with regard to this, nature protection differs from, for 
instance, agriculture. In agriculture, it is possible to develop new 
organisms, provided with biological programs making them more suited for 
breeding purposes. Moreover, in addition to protective regulation as 
nature protection uses it, agricultural regulation may be executed in 
the habitat itself. Examples are the supply of water and nutrients or 
the removal of 'natural ennemies'. In doing so, agricultural Man as it 
were by himself partly replaces the lump of soil which he would use in 
nature protection. The organisms concerned will presumably die back when 
Man does. For this reason, even when it would seem possible to do so, 
nature protection should not use regulation within the habitat. Here is 
the main difference between culturing and protection. 
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Ecodeviœs in an ecological field yield suitable habitats 
Apparently, organism and remoter environment coproduce habitat and 
milieu in a supply and demand system. The organism part in this system 
is, by its biological program, invariable. If a certain habitat continues 
to exist, in spite of the organism feeding on and discharging into it, 
this is most likely caused by an upkeeping or protective machinery in the 
remoter environment. In the design of a survey for nature protection, 
this machinery is the black box lump of soil mentioned in the earlier 
paragraph. At the same time, this machinery may be able to stabilize the 
driving forces in spite of environmental oscillations or trends. 
Destruction or generation of habitats can thus be attributed to varia-
tions in the performance of this machinery, and, the other way round, 
man can improve it to deliberately protect habitats. The most typical 
example of such an improved habitat protecting device, is the human house. 
The type of machinery meant is therefore called ecodevices (Both & van 
Wirdum 1979, van Leeuwen 1981, van Wirdum 1979a), and,-from the point 
of view of nature protection, classified according to the immediate user 
organism. Ecodevices, driven to produce or improve or protect the habi-
tat of Homo sapiens are called humecs (houses, towns, arable fields, 
meadows, recreational areas, water purification plants, rubbish-dumpts, 
etc.), whereas those for the protection of nature (against the side 
effects of humec driving!) are called natecs (van Wirdum, 1981). There 
is some discussion about the use of the combination nature reserve to-
day, but, typically, natecs are nature reserves and, anyhow, all nature 
reserves are natecs. 
To safeguard minimum and maximum concentrations in the habitat to be 
protected, an ecodevice must be able to enlarge or diminish both the 
incoming and the outgoing flows. This combines into four basic functions: 
supply, disposal, resistance and retention (compare also van Leeuwen, 
1979)- It is convenient to use the generalized driving forces - pheno-
menological coefficients - generalized fluxes idea again, the phenomeno-
logical coefficients being represented by the ecodevice this time. 
As the driving forces show geographical gradients, they are described 
by an ecological field. The type of relation of the field, the device 
and the habitat (more precisely still: the milieu) with the organism is 
intuitively talked about as positional, conditional and operational 
respectively (van Wirdum, 1979h)?'Bad performance of an ecodevice can 
have two main causes: device failures or field failures. Organisms, 
however, do not fail. Main trends in environmental and nature protection 
are: striving at constancy in the ecological field; adapting otherwise 
unsuited local field properties; and reconstruct ecodevices. Examples 
of these respective trends are: emission control by law; surrounding a 
natec with buffer zones; and digging down a natec soil. It is possible 
to have a single grain of sand as an ecodevice, as well as the whole 
earth. Most applications however will concern devices of a degree of 
complexity somewhere inbetween. Smaller devices will be dealt with in 
practice as ecodevice components. 
Ecosystems can serve to understand the use of ecodevices 
Destruction or generation of habitats has been attributed to varia-
tions in the performance of ecodevices, and, the other way round, it 
has been said, man can improve ecodevices and drive them to delibera-
tely protect habitats. It would have been convenient to name the human 
conception of real devices, in-advance of their deliberate use, ecosys-
tems • The system, thus, is a mental abstraction which helps man to under-
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stand things of nature. The device would be the realization of a modified 
system, helping man to have nature do things he wants it to. For this 
reason, van Wirdum ( 1979s-) tried: 'An ecosystem is an explanatory system 
of extra-individual relations between a particular phenomenon of living 
nature and its environment'. The mentioned phenomenon, or 'ecotopic', 
should itself "be considered a dependent factor. The ecotopic can be an 
individual organism (marginal case), a species, a population, a set of 
such things, or, probably, the occurrence of certain soil types, (un)pol-
luted waters, etc., which can be regarded phenomena due to living nature. 
Sloep (1980) hit at an apparent lack of formal rigidity in this defini-
tion and made a pro parte reconstruction, which should be accepted as 
a typical case: 'An ecosystem is a system of formal non-trivial rela-
tions of properties of a biological species and properties of its envi-
ronment' . He argues this typical case is a very unusual one, as it allows 
for a species to be the subject. Is the present ecosystem the same logi-
cal entity other authors on ecosystems seek to talk about? Three points 
can be made with respect to this question. 
At first, many authors say you can walk in an ecosystem, photograph 
it and identify it with an identification key (Ellenberg, 1973). 
Straightforwardly, Odum (1975) makes it a synonym of the biogeocoenose 
(compare also Fortescue, 1980). Yet, Tansley (1935), claimed the ecosys-
tem is the fundamental concept appropriate to a biome considered together 
with all the effective inorganic factors of its environment. Effective-
ness, now, might be slightly different from just being there! Moreover, 
Odum stresses the holistic idea with the wellknown example of the wa€er 
molecule, the properties of which are supposed to be different from 
what can be expected from the properties of both elements present. 
Exactly this key point of systems is lost in the way biogeocoenoses are 
recognized: a biogeocoenose is determined by saying, to put it that way, 
two H plus one 0 is water. It might well be that the only property that 
can be ascribed to what is conceived as a system in the whole thing, is 
just the occurrence of certain species. So, if a particular phenomenon 
of living nature (which may be a biological species) is the emerging 
property of a certain biogeocoenose as a system, it is all perfectly in 
order. If, however, the local presence of the biogeocoenose is the emer-
ging property, the abiotic factors considered effective, will only rare-
ly be confined to the same horizontal area where the biogeocoenose can 
be recognized and so the whole system will. 
At second, many authors mix up their holistic views with the idea of 
superorganisms. To be operational, my definition requires the user to 
state how much explanation is desired. Otherwise, the ecosystem concept 
would converge with the universe one. Here, Margalef (1968) is found 
paving my way: "Any ecosystem under study has to be delimited by arbi-
trary decision, but one has to remember always that the imposed bound-
aries are open, and that the sort of interaction going on across such 
boundaries is dependent on the properties of the two systems on either 
side of the boundary. With this proviso, all the problems of defining 
closed ecosystems, limiting superorganisms, etc., happily vanish. The 
open ecosystem is also suggested by Jenny (1958). The arbitrary decision 
in defining the extent of a system is indicated in many more or less 
fundamental systems texts. The point probably is, studying a moorland 
pool algae vegetation as a microcosm, differs from being a conservatio-
nist involved in the protection of species bound to land gradient belts. 
Consequently, however, also the recognizability of biomes and biogeocoe-
noses is doubtful, unless it is done by systems analysis as defended 
herein. 
At third, there is discussion whether a system is some concrete part 
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of reality (like with Margalef and also like a biogeocoenose), or an 
abstraction of it. In physical sciences, such definitions as (just an 
example is quoted): "The part of the universe under study in thermodyna-
mics is called the system" (Levine, 1978) > c a n D e found. Obviously, 
however, the students of those systems have a very abstract picture of 
the universe, provided with frictionless axes, adiabatic walls and more 
of this type of phantasy things (see textbooks, e.g. Kronig, 1966) and 
they seem to hate too open systems. In Systems Theory, much emphasis is 
on the abstraction to be made (compare Pask, 1961), and Sachs (1976), 
dividing between a teleological and a structural-relational approach in 
systems science, is clear about the latter:"... this approach fails to 
capture the essence of the notion of system, as that term is generally 
understood among systems scientists". If we accept that the reality of 
those physicists mentioned is just their mental image of reality, 
having more or less closed systems justifies the fact they do not always 
confine their systems according to definite would-be emerging properties. 
Land ecological reality however probably does not afford' this type of 
systems. As it has been stated in the second point, ecosystems are fun-
damentally open. How, effort in finding boundaries in reality is no 
longer mainly to limit the system, but to limit what one is going to 
study the system of. Thus proceeding, systems will gradually build up 
ones operational image of reality. 
In the setting of nature protection, the ecosystem concept tells there 
is more than just directly operational influences of man on populations 
of threatened species. Protection is to Me done by improving their 
'houses', which we conceive as ecosystems. The systems idea should guide 
inquiries of real devices of unknown internal composition and handling 
instructions. In the whole process of inquiry, the internal composition 
may stay unknown, but knowledge of the handling instructions must be 
gained to enable the draft of a user's manual, refering to the organi-
zation of the device. This organization is the system. 
Organisms are used in driving ecodevices 
The ecodevice is deliberately used by bringing the most damageable 
elements of reality in the regulatory part of the ecosystem under human 
protective control. Thus, the beneficiary will be made less sensitive 
to undesired environmental influences. The organism is the typical bene-
ficiary of ecodevices, but it is also useA as part in the devices them-
selves. The internal structure of an organism is only considered by 
saying it is provided with a fixed biological program. If there is no 
organism available which has the biological program desired, it can 
sometimes be made e.g. by a process of adaptation to a standard avail-
able ecodevice: domestication. Of course, this does not apply to an 
organism which has to be protected. 
According to their type, organisms are applied in driving ecodevices, 
either as working or as sensory parts, or they are the goal of the whole 
thing. In the use of organisms, no stochastic behaviour of any impor-
tance should be allowed. 
Apparently, three types of organisms can be distinguished: 
a) Goal organisms (goalos), their presence being the emergent proper-
ty of an ecosystem and the goal of an ecodevice. Examples: Homo sapiens 
is the goalo in all humec driving. In the independent use of speciali-
zed partial humecs, as in agriculture, e.g. cow is used as a substitute 
goalo. Carex dioica is a goalo in nature protection in The Netherlands. 
If more eatable or less demanding stuff or species can be made or found, 
agriculture will drop cow; if Carex dioica is no longer threatened in 
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The Netherlands, it will be dropped by nature protection. Man will pre-
sumably never be dropped as a goalo. 
b) Working ecodevice component organisms (wecos), doing physical labour 
within the ecodevice. Examples: cow can be an important weco in nature 
protection. Horse formerly was in agriculture and urban technique. Bow, 
it has been replaced by tractor and car respectively. 
c) Sensory ecodevice component organisms or indicatory organisms (indos), 
sensing changes of ecodevice performance and informing the ecodevice 
driver about this. Examples: lichen species are indos in the atmospheric 
branch of environmental hygienics, like Escherichia coli is in the water 
branch. Dirkse (197T) gives an interlocking series of indos, composed of 
Carex species, each of which is most useful once the next is goalo in na-
ture protection. If improvement is aimed at, as it basically is in tech-
niques, the first missing species in the series should be goalo until it 
is there and indicates moving on to a next goalo is opportune. 
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